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in Japan
During the past 30 years, Japan has had more suc-
cess than most countries in quelling inflation.  In the
1990s, its comparatively low inflation environment
has evolved into occasional deflation and an extended
period of low real growth, which was negative in
fourth quarter 1997 and first quarter 1998.  Long-
term interest rates have fallen to under 1.5 percent
and short-term rates to 0.5 percent.  Given Japan￿s
very low nominal interest rates, could monetary poli-
cy do still more to counter sluggish demand and
deflationary forces?  
The chart plots growth in a broad monetary aggregate
(M2+Certificates of Deposit), the GDP price deflator, and
real GDP in Japan from 1970 to 1997.  In the early
1970s, Japan￿s monetary growth accelerated when the
U.S. dollar￿s link to gold was abandoned.  Japan resisted
an appreciation of its currency by allowing faster domes-
tic monetary creation.  What followed in the mid-1970s
was a substantial inflation with sharp increases in oil and
other primary product prices. 
Later in the 1970s, Japan restored a low inflation
environment.  It experienced nothing like the double-
digit inflation the United States saw in the late 1970s
and early 1980s.  Unlike the U.S. experience, Japan￿s
monetary growth drifted down from levels of the early
1970s.  Inflation in Japan also drifted down from a
1974 peak with only a modest relapse in 1980.  There
was a gradual upturn in monetary growth in the mid-
1980s.  What followed in the late 1980s was a gradual
increase in inflation, although it remained low com-
pared with the 1970s experience.
Entering the 1990s, with inflation about 2 percent,
monetary growth fell sharply in 1991 and 1992.  In
part, this restrictive monetary impulse reflected actions
by the Bank of Japan to slow rapid increases in asset
prices in the so-called ￿Bubble Economy.￿  What fol-
lowed was that inflation in goods and services prices
fell to about zero (with slight deflation in 1995 and
1996), and asset prices tumbled.  Unexpected disinfla-
tion￿as presumably has occurred in Japan in the
1990s￿has had deleterious effects on both asset prices
and the soundness of bank loans.  
There may be other ways of restoring the Japanese
economy, but the historical record that links inflation
directly with monetary growth in Japan suggests that pol-
icy actions aimed at stimulating monetary growth would
provide a bulwark against the problems associated with
deflationary pressures and recession.  
Whether the Bank of Japan could pursue a more
expansionary monetary policy by buying securities to
increase the supply of base money is sometimes ques-
tioned because interest rates are exceptionally low in
Japan.  Sufficient monetary expansion, however, would
meet the liquidity demands in the economy and, thereby,
aid the recovery even if interest rates remain low.  A cen-
tral bank in a deflationary situation with troubled banks
must avoid interpreting low interest rates as an indicator
of an expansionary policy.  When monetary growth is
low and default risks are high as in Japan today, low
interest rates reflect expectations of both low (or nega-
tive) inflation and rates of return.  In such a situation, the
appropriate focus of monetary policy is on money and
not interest rates.             
—William G. Dewald
August 1998
Views expressed do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal Reserve System.
Percent









Monetary Growth and Inflation in Japan
year over year growth
M2+CDs GDP Deflator Real GDP 
InternationalEconomicTrends